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TORT LAW’S NEW QUARANTINISM: RACE AND
COERCION IN THE AGE OF A NOVEL
CORONAVIRUS
Sierra Stubbs* & John Fabian Witt**

INTRODUCTION
In the history of the law of epidemics, there have been two traditions in European and North American legal systems. The first, and in
some respects the oldest, has been quarantine. The second has been
sanitation.
Quarantinist policies first took their modern form in eastern Europe when cholera made its way from east to west in the eighteenthcentury. Autocratic states like Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Prussia
responded to the cholera threat by implementing controls that limited
freedom of movement in the service of public health.1 By enacting
these restrictive controls, as historian Peter Baldwin has analyzed,
these states recalibrated the balance between individual autonomy
and state preventive measures and, in so doing, further developed
modern iterations of absolutist government and politics.2 Prussia, for
example, authorized its soldiers to shoot violators of the militarized
cordon sanitaires along their borders.3 Throughout the region, travelers faced quarantines,4 enforced reporting requirements, isolation
obligations, and stiff criminal penalties, including imprisonment.5
The second strategy in the law of epidemics arose in the so-called
liberal states of western Europe.6 In the United Kingdom and in
France, for example, reform-minded public health policymakers
sought to regulate not individuals, but rather, more broadly, the environments in which people lived.7 Consider, for example, John Snow’s
* Yale Law School Class of 2023, sierra.stubbs@yale.edu.
** Duffy Class of 1960 Professor of Law, Yale University, john.witt@yale.edu. Many thanks
to Rebecca Brooks and Aaron Xiao Sobel for excellent research assistance.
1. PETER BALDWIN, CONTAGION AND THE STATE IN EUROPE, 1830–1930, at 41, 44, 51 (1999).
2. See id. at 12.
3. Id. at 43–44, 52.
4. Id. at 44.
5. See, e.g., id. at 57–58.
6. See id. at 10–12.
7. Id. at 238–40.
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famous study of cholera and the pollution of the Thames River, which,
to this day, stands for the proposition that state attention to environmental regulations can mitigate the spread of disease.8 A whole world
of legal provisions followed, ranging from street cleaning and municipal uplift to tenement reform.9 Some extended the sanitationist thesis
to encompass not only living conditions, but also moral conditions.10
Nineteenth-century theories of sanitationism thus encompassed a
spectrum of liberals, progressives, and conservatives, whose policies
included work requirements, enforced temperance, and mandatory
thrift.11
My recent book contends that the American law of epidemics has
historically been a mix of the two major European traditions and their
variants.12 The American experience has included powerful examples
of sanitationisms, progressive and conservative alike. But the United
States has had a robust tradition of autocratic quarantinism, too.
While the United States has historically pursued sanitationist policies
for white and middle- and upper-class Americans, it has also, in parallel, imposed quarantinist or authoritarian policies on low-income and
non-white populations.13
This Article proposes that in the COVID-19 pandemic, American
tort law has become the site for a new and distinctive variation of the
quarantinist tradition.14 For the first time in the history of the law of
epidemics, immunity for private parties from legal claims became a
central element of the legal response to infectious disease. Almost immediately with the arrival of SARS-CoV-2 in the United States in
February and March of 2020, business interests called for immunity
legislation on behalf of businesses and organizations.15 At the same
8. See generally JOHN SNOW, ON THE MODE OF COMMUNICATION OF CHOLERA 133–34
(1849).
9. See JOHN DUFFY, THE SANITARIANS: A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 126–92 (1990);
NANCY TOMES, THE GOSPEL OF GERMS 157–235 (1998).
10. E.g., EDWIN CHADWICK, REPORT ON THE SANITARY CONDITION OF THE LABOURING POPULATION OF GREAT BRITAIN 167–219 (M.W. Flinn ed., 1965) (1842).
11. See generally DUFFY, supra note 9.
12. JOHN FABIAN WITT, AMERICAN CONTAGIONS: EPIDEMICS AND THE LAW FROM SMALLPOX
TO COVID-19, at 9 (2020) [hereinafter WITT, AMERICAN CONTAGIONS].
13. Id.
14. For more on the topsy-turvy reorganization of the American law of epidemics in the
COVID-19 episode, see generally John Fabian Witt, Scrambling the New Sanitationist Synthesis:
Civil Liberties and Public Health in the Age of COVID-19, U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM (forthcoming
2022) (on file with author).
15. See, e.g., Elaine S. Povich, Businesses Want a Shield Against COVID-19 Lawsuits. But
What About Customer Safety?, PEW (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/researchand-analysis/blogs/stateline/2020/08/11/businesses-want-a-shield-against-covid-19-lawsuits-butwhat-about-customer-safety [https://perma.cc/6ZKW-UXBC].
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time, private industry began to produce private forms of immunity
through waivers by which individuals agreed to relinquish the right to
sue for COVID-19 risks.16 Together, the immunity legislation and the
virus liability waivers constitute a significant variation on American
governance of epidemics. They reflect a new quarantinism in American tort law, one that controls bodies and exercises coercive authority
through the delegation of unaccountable power to private parties.
The features of this new tort quarantinism illuminate a novel and
significant way in which American law now shapes the exercise of
power during moments of infection. Historically, quarantinisms have
entailed the direct exercise of coercive state power. Statist policies
were the centerpiece of quarantinist strategies. In the COVID-19 pandemic, efforts to reduce the private legal obligations of businesses and
organizations through tort immunities and waivers constitute one example of a new and potentially equally coercive legal response. Tort
reform in the age of the novel coronavirus has meant the reallocation
and magnification of private coercive resources through background
rules of private law. The new quarantinism has been, in some ways, a
privatization of what was once the public exercise of state control. As
this Article examines, the consequences of this form of privatization
have been deadly for the most vulnerable populations in the United
States. Tort reform is only one dimension of a broader move in the
law of epidemics that focuses on private rather than public power.17
The new quarantinism in tort is emblematic of the ways in which law
in the era of COVID-19 has revealed the coercive force immanent in
private power.
In what follows, this Article offers a preliminary sketch of the new
landscape of immunity and waivers. Part I takes up immunity legislation. Part II turns to the proliferation of liability waivers. Part III describes the impact of such forms of private power for the most
vulnerable communities in the country, focusing on the very real effects of tort immunities in the context of meatpacking plants and prisons. Older American quarantinisms targeted poor communities and
non-white communities. The new quarantinism does the same. The
emerging tort law exacerbates private inequalities and increases the
risks of infection, injury, and death for the most vulnerable among us.

16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III.B.
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I. IMMUNITY LEGISLATION
New rules limiting the domain of tort liability have proliferated at
both the state and federal levels during the pandemic. The discussion
below describes the new immunity provisions and offers an account of
their significance. But it is worth reviewing the history of tort immunity to put the new developments into context.
A. Reciprocal Immunities and Nonreciprocal Immunities
Legislative immunities have long been a part of the landscape of
tort principles. The very first workers’ compensation laws in the
United States offered injured workers a choice between compensation
claims and tort suits.18 The former offered secure but limited damages.19 The latter offered the potential for full compensation20 but
placed the burden on plaintiffs to succeed at making out all of the
elements of a common law tort claim.21 But when such laws ran into
constitutional obstacles in the state courts,22 compensation statutes
turned decisively to the quid pro compensation model.23 Legislatures
gave employees the security of sure and steady workers’ compensation benefits – but also gave employers immunity from tort suits by
their employees.24 The guarantee of damages for injured employees
came along with immunity from tort suits for employers.25 The arrangement thus left in place an approximation of the existing baseline
of distributions between the relevant classes.26 Employees gained and
lost. Employers gained and lost.
A whole host of quid pro quo immunity statutes followed over the
course of the twentieth century. Congress gave the victims of future
nuclear disasters a limited compensation for their injuries in return for
18. JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE
WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 125–52 (2004) [hereinafter WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC]. See also PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, PRELUDE TO
THE WELFARE STATE 197–204 (2000) (arguing workers’ compensation schemes succeeded because all parties – labor, management, insurance companies – benefited from their creation).
19. See generally LEX LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW ch. 1 (2010);
Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers’ Compensation “Reform”, 50
RUTGERS L. REV. 657 (1998).
20. JOHN FABIAN WITT & KAREN M. TANI, TORTS: CASES, PRINCIPLES, AND INSTITUTIONS
609–10 (5th ed. 2020).
21. See CRYSTAL EASTMAN, WORK-ACCIDENTS AND THE LAW 169–89 (Paul Underwood Kellogg ed., 1910).
22. Ives v. S. Buff. Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431, 433 (N.Y. 1911). See also WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL
REPUBLIC, supra note 18, at 152–55.
23. WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC, supra note 18, at 181–82.
24. See Jensen v. S. Pac. Co., 109 N.E. 600 (N.Y. 1915).
25. WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC, supra note 18, at 181–82.
26. Id.
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their traditional tort remedies.27 No-fault auto insurance laws in many
states removed minor auto injuries from the tort system, substituting
mandatory first-party insurance arrangements for tort suits.28 The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act established a no-fault system of
vaccine injury compensation, displacing most tort liability for childhood vaccines.29 Proposals circulated for decades to enact further quid
pro quo reforms, including the replacement of all automobile tort litigation with no-fault systems or the establishment of similar changes in
medical malpractice.30 The 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund took
something of this structure, too, by offering inducements to victims’
families to enter the compensation system rather than take their
chances in tort.31
In the past forty-five years, however, a different kind of legislation
limiting tort liability has surged to the fore. The 1975 enactment of
California’s Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) led
the way.32 MICRA did not offer immunity from liability, at least not
in principle. Instead, it offered defendants immunity from non-pecuniary damages in medical malpractice cases over a $250,000 maximum.33
MICRA’s story, and that of the tort reform movement that followed,
in medical malpractice and in other areas of personal injury, has been
told often and well.34 But the analytic structure of the tort reform laws
is worth drawing out. MICRA and the laws that followed enacted a
nonconsensual redistribution between the class of tort plaintiffs and
tort defendants. The laws redistributed resources away from people
identified by juries or trial judges as the most injured, namely with
injuries so grave that the non-pecuniary damages exceeded the new
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006); see also Daniel Kolomitz, A Nuclear Threat: Why the Price Anderson Act Must Be Amended, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 853, 859–60 (2016) (arguing that the Price Anderson Act should be amended to preempt state statutes that address nuclear incidents, including
those that do not rise to the level of a nuclear incident under the meaning of the federal statute).
28. Nora Freeman Engstrom, An Alternative Explanation for No-Fault’s Demise, 61 DEPAUL
L. REV. 303, 319 (2012).
29. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11 (2016).
30. KENNETH ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11, at 69–138 (2010); Robert L. Rabin, The Renaissance of Accident
Law Plans Revisited, 64 MD. L. REV. 699, 701 (2005).
31. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2001).
32. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 2021).
33. Id. at § 3333.2.
34. E.g., John Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of
Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1028, 1054 (2005); Robert L. Rabin, Federalism and the Tort System, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 3 (1997); Robert L. Rabin, Some Reflections on
the Process of Tort Reform, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 13, 13–15 (1988); “Common Sense” Legislation: The Birth of Neoclassical Tort Reform, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1766–68 (1996).
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cap of a quarter million dollars.35 Anyone with non-pecuniary damages at or below the caps, after all, would never feel the damages cap.
The effect of the MICRA cap – and of the dozens of caps that followed in states around the country – was to coercively rearrange the
private relations of tort plaintiffs and defendants in such a way as to
systematically disadvantage the most those parties who were the least
well-off, namely the parties whose injuries were the worst.36
Dozens of similar tort damages caps have been enacted in state legislatures around the country, many of them expanding beyond the
original medical malpractice context to establish non-pecuniary damages caps for virtually the entire domain of accidental injuries. Many
of them followed the MICRA pattern of capping non-pecuniary damages.37 As time went by, the caps often increased the original MICRA
limit of $250,000.38 But legislators rarely indexed the caps for inflation, which means that the real value of damages caps systematically
drops over time.
Crucially, the MICRA introduced a distinctive form of defendant
immunity without the reciprocal quid pro quo compensation of the
workers’ compensation tradition. To be sure, such immunity did not
insulate defendants from pecuniary damages or from the first quartermillion dollars in non-pecuniary damages.39 But the post-MICRA tort
reform movement took a turn in 2005 when Congress enacted the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA).40 The PLCAA
went further than the damages caps of the MICRA model. It immunized firms in the firearm industry from a wide swath of personal injury liability.41 But the PLCAA established immunity with no
accompanying benefit for the immunity provision’s losers.42 The PLCAA was a one-way redistribution like the MICRA enactment, one
that reallocated from tort plaintiffs to tort defendants, with no substi-

35. Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1279 (2004).
36. See id.
37. See generally Rabin, Some Reflections on the Process of Tort Reform, supra note 34.
38. Id.
39. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 2021).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 7901–03 (2012).
41. Id.
42. See Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, What is Gun Control: Direct Burdens, Incidental Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 295, 310–13
(2016); Andrew Jay McClurg, The Second Amendment Right to Be Negligent, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1,
8–9 n.26 (2016); Comment, Tort Law – Civil Immunity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1941 (2006).
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tute compensation mechanism.43 The result was another nakedly coercive redistribution by the state among private parties.
Let us pause here with this idea. What does it mean to call tort
reform enactments coercive redistributions? Observers of tort reform
arrangements do not often think of legal reforms in tort in these
terms.44 But it is useful to do so, at least from time to time, to regain
one’s analytic bearings in the sea of catch-all umbrella labels like
“public” and “private.” To say that the PLCAA was coercive is not, to
be clear, the same as saying that it was bad. The term “coercive” here
functions in the sense in which the progressive lawyer-economist Robert Hale used it a century ago.45 The PLCAA undoubtedly had myriad
effects and meanings, some perhaps good, others decidedly less so. To
say that a legal change like the PLCAA coercively redistributes is simply to observe that the effects of the PLCAA on the class of future
plaintiffs and defendants are nonconsensual and alter the power and
resources available to individuals and firms in the private sphere.
B. Nonreciprocal Immunities in the Era of COVID-19
The arrival of the SARS-CoV-2 virus in the United States sparked a
new wave of coercively redistributive enactments in the form of tort
immunity legislation. Immunity legislation in the era of COVID-19
does not aim, as workers’ compensation did or as the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act did, to replace tort with a compensation system on the model of work injury compensation. Instead, the new
legislation carries forward decades of tort reform efforts, replete with
the hidden coercive effects. The new legislation also produced a new
development in the law of epidemics. Never in the history of the law
of epidemics had the spread of infection been accompanied by the
immunization of broad swaths of society against the threat of
litigation.
Let us review some of what has happened, mostly in the state legislatures. Since March 2020, nearly half the states in the United States
have enacted broad coronavirus business liability shields limiting
harmed individuals’ ability to win personal injury lawsuits.46 As of
43. Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratory of Democracy, 50 WM. & M. L.
REV. 1501, 1540 (2009).
44. See, e.g., sources cited, supra note 34.
45. Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Redistribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL.
SCI. Q. 470, 470–71 (1923).
46. There are twenty-four states with broad coronavirus liability shields. See, e.g., Chris Marr,
States Prolong Covid-19 Liability Shields as Pandemic Persists, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 20, 2021,
12:38 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/states-prolong-covid-19-liabilityshields-as-pandemic-persists.
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mid-April 2021, eight more states have such liability shields pending
somewhere in the legislative process.47 Seventeen states either have
narrow coronavirus liability shields or no liability shield at all.48 Examples of the former include New York’s now-repealed statute immunizing healthcare providers and the manufacturers and distributors of
personal protective equipment.49
Some states have enacted immunity legislation that is so broad it
could effectively prohibit plaintiffs from bringing successful claims.
For example, South Dakota’s liability shield states that “[a] person
may not bring or maintain any action or claim for damages or relief
alleging exposure or potential exposure to COVID-19 unless the exposure results in a COVID-19 diagnosis and the exposure is the result
of intentional exposure with the intent to transmit COVID-19.”50 At
certain periods in time, South Dakota was among the states with the
least coronavirus-related regulatory restrictions.51 At one point early
in November 2020, the state’s per-capita rate of new cases was twice
the highest per-capita rate in the United States during the entire epidemic.52 Around that same time, South Dakota’s hot spot had the
third-highest per-capita COVID-19 death rate in the world.53
South Dakota’s high death rates can be considered in light of the
effects of its tort immunity act. It is worth considering just how high of
a pleading threshold intentional transmission is. It is not enough for a
plaintiff in a South Dakota case to show that a defendant spread infection by negligence. A defendant is only susceptible to liability if the
plaintiff can show that the defendant knew with a substantial certainty
that infection would follow from their conduct, or if the plaintiff can
show that the defendant’s conduct was motivated by a purpose to in47. Id.
48. Id.
49. N.Y. Pub. Health §§ 3080–82 (McKinney 2020), repealed by N.Y. Laws 2021 ch. 56, § 1;
Roy Breitenbach, COVID-19 Immunity from Liability Provisions, Adopted in Emergency, Now
Repealed in New York State, JD SUPRA (Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/
covid-19-immunity-from-liability-5792048/.
50. H.B. 1046, 2021 Leg., 96th Sess. (S.D. 2021) (emphasis added).
51. Adam McCann, States with the Fewest Coronavirus Restrictions, WALLETHUB (Apr. 6,
2021), https://wallethub.com/edu/states-coronavirus-restrictions/73818.
52. See New York Times Covid-19 Tracker, NY TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2021/us/covid-cases.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2022).
53. Zack Budryk, North Dakota Records World’s Highest COVID-19 Mortality Rate, THE
HILL (Nov. 17, 2020, 12:29 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/526324-north-dakotarecords-worlds-highest-covid-19-mortality-rate; Aaron Blake, Kristi Noem Hails South Dakota
as a Coronavirus Success Story — Using Badly Cherry-Picked Numbers, WASH. POST (Dec. 8,
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/12/08/kristi-noem-hails-south-dakota-coronavirus-success-story-using-badly-cherry-picked-numbers.
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fect the plaintiff.54 During most of the pandemic, few people had substantial certainty as to what would lead to transmission.
Oklahoma is an example of a state with broad immunity legislation.55 The legislation states that no person shall be liable in a civil
action for injury arising out of exposure to the SARS-CoV-2 virus if
their conduct was “in compliance or consistent with federal or state
regulations, a Presidential or Gubernatorial Executive Order, or guidance applicable at the time of the alleged exposure.”56 The
Oklahoma legislation provided further that where “two or more
sources of guidance” were “applicable to the conduct or risk at the
time of the alleged exposure,” no person will be liable if the conduct
was “consistent with any applicable guidance.”57 The lowest regulatory denominator sets the tort standard. For a period of time,
Oklahoma had the least substantial coronavirus-related regulatory restrictions of any state – even fewer than South Dakota.58
As of this writing, thirty-four states and the District of Columbia
have enacted legislation limiting liability. Across these bills, two types
of immunity from liability are granted: 1) blanket immunity to different kinds of facilities, namely, any business, governmental entity, and
religious and/or cultural institutions; and 2) immunity from liability
for public health agents and healthcare providers.59 Some states have
54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 1 (AM. LAW.
INST. 2010).
55. S.B. 1946, 57th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2020). The Bill reads in full:
A person or agent of the person who conducts business in this state shall not be liable
in a civil action claiming an injury from exposure or potential exposure to COVID-19 if
the act or omission alleged to violate a duty of care of the person or agent was in
compliance or consistent with federal or state regulations, a Presidential or Gubernatorial Executive Order, or guidance applicable at the time of the alleged exposure. If two
or more sources of guidance are applicable to the conduct or risk at the time of the
alleged exposure, the person or agent shall not be liable if the conduct is consistent with
any applicable guidance.
Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. KLFY Staff, Wallet Hub: Oklahoma has Least Coronavirus Restrictions in the Nation,
OKLA. NEWS 4 (Jan. 26, 2021, 5:09 PM), https://kfor.com/news/local/wallet-hub-oklahoma-hasleast-coronavirus-restrictions-in-the-nation.
59. States that have passed legislation guaranteeing the first kind of immunity are: S.B. 30,
2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2021); H.B. 6, 65th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Idaho 2020); S.B. 2388, 88th
Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2020); S.B. 1, 122nd Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2021); S.B. 3049,
2020 Leg., 145th Sess. (Miss. 2020); S.B. 65, 2021 Leg., 67th Sess. (Mont. 2021); S.B. 4, 2020 Leg.,
32d Spec. Sess. (Nev. 2020); H.B. 118, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2020); S.B. 1946,
57th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2020); S.B. 5003, 2020 Leg., 5th Spec. Sess. (Utah 2020); H.B. 4402,
80th Leg. Assemb., 3rd Spec. Sess. (Or. 2020) (protection for public and private schools); S.B.
8002, 2020 Gen. Assemb., 2d Spec. Sess. (Tenn. 2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 20 (2021) (state
agencies and political subdivisions). States providing for the second kind of immunity are: S.B.
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also already extended their respective immunity legislation, with
Georgia extending its immunity through July 2022 and Kansas until
March 2022.60
What does the new immunity legislation mean? Following the analysis offered regarding immunity legislation in the twentieth and
twenty-first-century tort reform movement, such legislation represents
an unconsented to coercive redistribution of resources from the class
of people infected and injured by SARS-CoV-2 to the businesses and
organizations benefiting from COVID-19 immunity. To be clear, businesses and organizations are a nexus of contracts61 – a node in a network of relationships among stakeholders, including shareholders,
customers, creditors, executives, and employees, among others.62
When the law distributes resources to them, there is nothing a priori
that determines the final resting place of those resources in the network that is the firm.63 Some or all of the parties may benefit or lose
out from a legal change in their favor, but which stakeholders change
and how much is a complex question turning on relative elasticities of
supply and demand in the market and also on myriad institutional factors shaping the structure of the networks and firms in question.64
The stakeholders of a firm benefitting from immunity legislation
will even, on occasion, include some people in the class of people
harmed by the very same legislation. Such people will find themselves
on both sides of the law’s redistributive effect. For such individuals, it
will be as if the law picks from their left pocket and quietly lines their
right. There is even reason to think, as the network sociologists remind us, that the class of people most likely to be infected will consist
disproportionately of the most socially connected people, including
241, 31st Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2020); D.C. CODE § 7-311 (2021); Haw. Exec. Order No. 20-05
(Apr. 16, 2020); Ill. Exec. Order No. 27 (Apr. 1, 2020); H.B. 2016, 88th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Kan.
2020); S.B. 150, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2020); H.B. 826, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La.
2020); MD. CODE ANN., Pub. Safety § 14-3A-06 (West 2021); S.B. 2640, 2020 Leg., 191st Gen. Ct.
(Mass. 2020); H.B. 6031, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2020); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-71-7 (West
2020); S.B. 2333, 219th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2020); N.M. Exec. Order 2020-083 (Mar. 11, 2020);
Executive Order to Enhance Protections for Health Care Professionals (Pa. May 6, 2020); R.I.
Exec. Order 20-21 (Apr. 10, 2020); 2019 Wis. Act 185 (Apr. 15, 2020); S.B. 2, 65th Leg., Spec.
Sess. (Wyo. 2020).
60. H.B. 112, 2021-2022 Leg., Gen. Assemb. (Ga. 2020); S.B. 283, 2021-2022 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Kan. 2020); Marr, supra note 46.
61. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
62. Mariana Pargendler, Veil Peeking: The Corporation as a Nexus for Regulation, 169 U. PA.
L. REV. 717, 720 nn.5–6 (2021).
63. N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 125–27 (6th ed. 2012) (explaining basic
economics of tax incidence).
64. Id.
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the most wealthy and best resourced,65 though they of course will
have access to the best care and are least likely to be gravely injured
by an infection.66 But setting these puzzles aside, one thing should be
clear: SARS-CoV-2 immunity legislation, all things being equal, redistributes exclusively to firms that would have been subject to damages
payments under the standard common law of negligence and distributes to them exclusively from those with colorable claims of infection
and injury therefrom.
II. LIABILITY WAIVERS
Public law efforts to secure immunity have been combined with private mechanisms to do so as well. Businesses and organizations across
the United States have also pursued a different, but related, path to
avoiding liability arising out of the pandemic. Contractual waivers of
liability proliferated at the start of the COVID-19 emergency.
Like the tort reform movement, the practice of using contractual
waivers has been on the rise for decades.67 Despite the widespread
state law protections for businesses and organizations, COVID-19 liability waivers have cropped up everywhere, like a belt-and-suspenders
approach to securing immunity. Like the cicadas of the spring of 2021,
COVID-19 waivers are almost everywhere (at least the cicadas of the
spring of 2021 were limited to a particular swath of the country).
COVID-19 liability waivers appear in all the commercial spaces in
which liability waivers have been familiar: gyms and health clubs,
sporting events, children’s activities, and more.68 But in the year after
the arrival of SARS-CoV-2 in the United States, liability waivers popped up in a wide array of less familiar places. Nonprofit and charitable
organizations like the Girl Scouts,69 the United Way,70 and the Na65. NICHOLAS A. CHRISTAKIS, APOLLO’S ARROW: THE PROFOUND AND ENDURING IMPACT
CORONAVIRUS ON THE WAY WE LIVE 55–57 (2020).
66. See Jack Kelly, The Rich Are Riding Out the Coronavirus Pandemic Very Differently Than
the Rest of Us, FORBES (Apr. 1, 2020, 4:23 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackkelly/2020/04/
01/the-rich-are-riding-out-the-coronavirus-pandemic-very-differently-than-the-rest-of-us.
67. Ryan Martins, Shannon Price & John Fabian Witt, Contract’s Revenge: The Waiver Society
and the Death of Tort, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1265, 1268–69 (2020).
68. Sunnie Ning, Are Covid Waivers Enforceable? Look to Gym Waivers for Insights, HARV.
L. BILL OF HEALTH (Sept. 18, 2020), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/09/18/arecovid19-liability-waivers-enforceable.
69. Girl Scouts of Eastern Pennsylvania, COVID-19 Waiver of Liability and Indemnification,
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:y9qd-fQWlM8J:https://www.gsep.org/
content/dam/girlscouts-gsep/documents/covid-19-documents/GSEP%2520covid-19-waiver-of-liability-and-indemnification.pdf+&cd=100&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=US&client=firefox-b-1-e (last updated Sept. 2020).
70. United Way of Santa Barbara, Assumption of the Risk and Waiver of Liability Relating to
Coronavirus/COVID-19 (Oct. 2021), https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?
OF
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tional Multiple Sclerosis Society,71 among uncountable thousands of
others, adopted waivers of liability to limit their exposure. Afterschool sports programs in school districts required participants to execute waivers.72 Hair salons did, too.73 At least one prison required
waivers from prisoners.74 Spectators at WrestleMania 37 entered on
the condition that they sign a waiver.75 Participants who attended political rallies for the former President of the United States were also
required to sign waivers.76 Wedding planners advised their clients to
include COVID-19 waivers in their wedding invitations77 (better than
asking for signatures at the wedding itself, they advised, since the latter approach might lead to mixed feelings on the big day). Film production companies employed COVID-19 waivers.78 The American
Bar Association reported early in the pandemic that “[d]entist and
doctor’s offices, salons, restaurants, gyms, day care centers, movie theaters and bowling alleys are just some of the businesses now asking
people to sign COVID-19 waivers.”79
q=cache:y0XDQASGjGYJ:https://www.unitedwaysb.org/sites/unitedwaysb.org/files/PDF%27s/
Waivers/Covid-19%2520Volunteer%2520Liability%2520Waiver.pdf+&cd=
5&hl=EN&ct=clnk&gl=US&client=firefox-b-1-e.
71. National Multiple Sclerosis Society, Event Release and Waiver of Liability (Oct.2021),
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:rwMJk8-hiukJ:main.nationalmssociety.
org/site/DocServer/Special_Events_Release_and_Waiver_of_Liability.pdf%3FdocID%3D80380
+&cd=23&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-b-1-e.
72. See School District Waiver of Liability Template, available at https://www.osaa.org/docs/
osaainfo/Waiver-of-Liability-for-COVID-19-Student-Sport-or-Activity.pdf (last visited Jan. 13,
2022).
73. Tom Krisher & Mark Sherman, Coronavirus Liability Waivers: Businesses Want Customers
and Workers to Give Up Their Right to Sue over COVID-19. Can They Do That?, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (June 17, 2020, 8:51 AM), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/business/ct-biz-coronavirus-liability-waivers-20200616-pk2mcrbxyjgzxctqy63toz54hu-story.html.
74. Prison Under Fire for Asking Inmates for Covid Liability Waivers, KHN MORNING BRIEFING (May 19, 2021), https://khn.org/morning-breakout/prison-under-fire-for-asking-inmates-forcovid-liability-waivers/.
75. Marc Middleton, WWE Releases WrestleMania 37 COVID-19 Protocols, Liability Waiver,
and Risk Agreements, WRESTLING INC. (Mar. 18, 2021), https://www.wrestlinginc.com/news/2021/
03/wwe-releases-wrestlemania-37-covid-19-protocols-liability-waiver-and-risk-agreements/;
Louis Dangoor, Report: Fans Attending WWE WrestleMania 37 Must Sign Liability Waivers,
WRESTLETALK.COM (Mar. 2021), https://wrestletalk.com/news/report-fans-attending-wwe-wrestlemania-37-must-sign-liability-waivers/.
76. Laura Lorek, How Effective are Liability Waivers in the Age of the Novel Coronavirus?,
ABA JOURNAL (July 2, 2020, 9:33 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/understandingliability-waivers-in-the-age-of-covid-19.
77. Caroline Fox, FREE SAMPLE COVID-19 WAIVER - Do I Need a COVID Waiver for
Weddings and Events?, ENGAGED LEGAL, https://blog.engagedlegal.com/blog/covid-19-waiverwedding (last visited Jan. 13, 2022).
78. Teresa Beardsley, Producer’s Guide: Covid-19 Waivers & Forms, WRAPBOOK.COM (Apr.
16, 2021), https://www.wrapbook.com/blog/covid-19-waivers-forms.
79. Lorek, supra note 76.
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Colleges and universities got into the waiver business, too, requiring
students to sign liability waivers for coronavirus injuries before returning to school.80 The University of Alabama attempted to require
students to sign documentation stating that they “voluntarily assume
such risk” of returning to campus in person,81 though the university
changed the language when some students refused to sign the
waiver.82 The University of New Hampshire’s liability waiver captured
the general language typical of many such university waivers:
By signing below, I understand the University of New Hampshire’s
approach to on-campus learning during the COVID-19 pandemic. I
understand that my decision to return to on-campus programming is
voluntary. I understand that UNH cannot guarantee my health or
immunity from infection. I understand there are risks of exposure to
the virus from symptomatic and asymptomatic carriers. I recognize
that the risks of exposure to COVID-19 include sharing space with
others and engaging in interpersonal communications. I assume the
risks associated with being at the University of New Hampshire including the risk of exposure to COVID-19.83

Some public-school districts required parents to sign liability waivers in order for their children to return to in-person learning. For example, a South Carolina school district’s waiver required parents to
“assume[ ] the risk and responsibility if their child gets sick or even
dies from COVID-19.”84 When parents criticized the school district’s
decision to implement a liability waiver, the school district replied that
“[t]he waiver is necessary to have a voluntary re-opening of schools
during a pandemic when risk – both known and unknown – cannot be
quantified.”85 No one explained how shifting the risk to families
would help with the quantifying, though to be sure, it might relieve
the district and its insurers of doing the calculation.
The mechanism for the spread of COVID-19 waivers seems at least
in part to have been a new array of health status check forms used by
80. See Greta Anderson, Colleges Seek Waivers from Risk-Taking Students, INSIDE HIGHER
ED. (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/08/03/students-asked-sign-liability-waivers-return-campus.
81. Erika Beras, Students Face COVID-19 Liability Waivers Upon Return to Campus, MARKETPLACE (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.marketplace.org/2020/09/02/students-face-covid-19-liability-waivers-upon-return-to-campus/.
82. Id.
83. University of New Hampshire, Informed Consent Agreement for Students Participating in
On-Campus Programming for the Fall Semester (July 16, 2020), https://www.unh.edu/sites/default
/files/departments/student_life/informed_consent_agreement_for_unh_students_july.16.2020.pdf
(emphasis added).
84. Kaitlin Stansell, Berkeley Co. School District Requires Parents to Sign COVID Waiver for
In-Person Instruction, LIVE 5 NEWS (July 20, 2020), https://www.live5news.com/2020/07/20/
berkeley-co-school-district-requires-parents-sign-covid-waiver-in-person-instruction.
85. Id.
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service providers and organizations, on the one hand, and individual
customers or participants, on the other. For example, hair salons in
Florida introduced forms asking whether the customer or any of their
family members had symptoms of the virus; it was of little cost to add
additional language asking customers to waive their liability.86 From
my personal experience, the barbershop in New Haven, Connecticut,
where my hair is typically cut, used a widely available iPad app for
barber shops, which ran the patron through a battery of COVID-19
questions and bundled the COVID-19 questions together with a
waiver clause.87 In Los Angeles, lawyers at the actors’ union Screen
Actors Guild - American Federation of Television and Radio Artists
(SAG-AFTRA) reported that film productions had started with
coronavirus healthcare questionnaires and then added new features
including waivers.88 “Oh, well, if they’re already filling out this form,”
the logic seems to have gone, “why don’t we have them sign something that basically in some form tries to limit the liability of the employer for potential risk” said SAG-AFTRA’s chief operating officer
and general counsel.89 A similar pattern appeared in healthcare. The
American Academy of Periodontology’s standard COVID-19 form
for the informed consent of the patient is actually a COVID-19 waiver
in disguise, not a patient-protective form at all.90
The spread of COVID-19 waivers has produced considerable resistance. Unions objected.91 Sophisticated employment-side lawyers
warned their clients that waivers would often be more trouble than
they were worth, at least with respect to employee infection injuries.92
Critics observed, too, that waivers in the infectious disease context
86. Krisher & Sherman, supra note 73 (“The form, which also asks patrons if they or any
family members have virus symptoms, gives the salon extra legal protection . . . .”).
87. Author’s personal experience, Fall 2020, New Haven, Connecticut.
88. Anousha Sakoui, As Hollywood Reopens, COVID-19 Liability Waivers Abound: What are
They and Should You Sign?, LA TIMES (Sept. 11, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/
entertainment-arts/business/story/2020-09-11/covid-19-liability-waivers-hollywood-productionunions.
89. Id.
90. See COVID-19 Resources, AM. ACAD. OF PERIODONTOLOGY, https://www.perio.org/members/COVID-19 (last visited Jan. 13, 2022).
91. See Ana Swanson & Alan Rappeport, Businesses Want Virus Legal Protection. Workers
Are Worried., N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/business/economy/coronavirus-liability-shield.html (“Unions including the United Steelworkers, the United
Farm Workers, the Teamsters and the American Federation of Teachers have also protested
expanded liability protections, fearing that they would lead to laxer safety standards for
workers.”).
92. Allen Smith, When Should COVID-19 Waivers, Acknowledgements and Notices Be Used?,
SHRM (July 17, 2020), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/employ
ment-law/pages/coronavirus-waivers-acknowledgments.aspx.
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presented an unusual and distinctive problem.93 In a typical gym or
amusement park waiver, the customer or participant is asked to sign
away isolated risks that are plausibly described as their own to sign
away.94 But because a person is also a disease vector, the customer
who signs away protections against infection poses a new and uncontained risk to the community around them. Waivers between private
parties are especially inapt for such collective risks.95 On the one
hand, third parties are put at risk by the waivers if the waivers induce
people or organizations to exercise less care than they otherwise
would.96 However, waivers do nothing to immunize the organizations
that use them from suit by such third parties, since the latter never
agreed to waive the right to sue.97 Waivers in such settings often fail
both their victims and their apparent beneficiaries. Waivers and infectious disease indeed seem poorly suited to one another. Infection
raises social questions of public health that evade the bilateral, partyspecific features of the private waiver contract.
Perhaps it is no wonder, then, that certain highly publicized waivers
generated considerable resistance in the political process. For example, when Ohio State University’s athletics program began asking that
student athletes sign something that resembled a cross between an informed consent and community compact, on the one hand, and a lawsuit waiver, on the other, the ensuing controversy led members of the
U.S. Senate to get involved.98 The National Collegiate Athletic Association soon ordered its member schools, including Ohio State, not to
require such waivers from their student athletes.99
For these reasons and more, the enforceability of COVID-19 waiver
agreements is not yet clear. The enforceability of tort waivers generally varies substantially from state to state.100 As of this writing, no
reported judicial decision rules on the question one way or another,

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. Rick Maese, Senators Press NCAA for Coronavirus Rules, Criticize Schools’ Liability
Waivers, WASH. POST (July 1, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2020/07/01/senators-press-ncaa-coronavirus-rules-criticize-schools-liability-waivers.
99. Joey Kaufman, NCAA Says Schools Cannot Require COVID Liability Waivers, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Aug. 5, 2020, 4:21 PM), https://www.dispatch.com/story/special/2020/08/05/ncaasays-schools-cannot-require-covid-liability-waivers/42172353.
100. See generally Martins, Price & Witt, supra note 67.
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though the law review literature is beginning to produce arguments on
enforceability.101
The enforceability of such waivers is likely to be as widely varying
as the enforcement of other waivers have been. Courts asked to decide on enforceability in waiver cases typically consider factors such as
whether the business or organization in question is “of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation”; whether the service is “of
great importance to,” or “a matter of practical necessity” for, the public; whether the service is available “for any member of the public”;
whether the party seeking to enforce the agreement possessed an “advantage of bargaining strength”; whether the agreement was “a standardized adhesion contract” with no possibility of an alternative
arrangement; and whether a person is placed by the agreement “under
the control” of another party and thereby made unduly vulnerable to
“the risk of carelessness.”102
Crucially, such factors relate to the nature of the business in question, not the character of the risk at issue. But of course, infectious
disease presents a different kind of risk than those around which most
tort liability contracts are organized. Despite its differences, infectious
disease, in other words, is not singled out for special treatment in the
law of waiver enforcement. It is instead enfolded into a private and
public law scheme that is concerned generally with the businesses and
accommodations in question and their economic functions.
Some might predict that waiver contracts will be less likely in the
pandemic context given the universal need to take precautions to limit
the spread of the disease. Consequently, these imagined limitations on
waiver enforceability in the pandemic context might in turn force a
reckoning with the general mass use of liability waivers. But in the law
of SARS-CoV-2, this private enforcement mechanism has been buttressed by state statutes granting immunity; it is therefore unlikely
that the COVID-19 pandemic will somehow shift us toward waiver
non-enforcement.
Here, then, is the resulting situation in the American consumer
economy: Citizens and consumers are asked pervasively to participate
in economic life on the condition that they waive protections that they
would otherwise have against the negligent conduct of others. Courts
may or may not enforce such agreements. But it is difficult, even for
experts, to do more than guess at the enforceability of the arrangements – and that is surely part of the point. Waivers are the exercise of
101. Leah A. Plunkett & Michael S. Lewis, Education Contracts of Adhesion in the Covid-19
Pandemic, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2021).
102. Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 445–46 (Cal. 1963).
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private power among private individuals and institutions whose positions in the market lead them for one reason or another to alter background tort rights and obligations.
III. THE NEW PRIVATE QUARANTINISM
At the end of September 2021, the litigation trackers at Hunton Andrews Kurth reported more than 13,000 total cases filed in state and
federal courts related to the COVID-19 pandemic.103 But of those
13,000, no more than 832 cases, and perhaps far fewer, arose out of
personal injury claims.104
If merely 6.5% of COVID-19 claims are for personal injury or
wrongful death, then surely, one might think, neither the personal injury and wrongful death cases, nor the immunity legislation, nor the
injury waivers can be all that socially significant. How much coercive
authority has the law been deploying in the domain of tort and tort
reform if the cases are so few?
First, the number of COVID-19 cases in the courts is a function, in
part, of the widespread enactment of immunity legislation and the
widespread use of injury waivers. Selection effects, reporting effects,
and endogeneity distort tort statistics generally, and COVID-19 cases
are no different.105 Second, the tort immunity and waiver phenomena
offer vivid illustrations of a new pattern emerging across the law, and
not only in tort.106 Immunity legislation and waiver agreements capture the spirit of a new departure in the American law of epidemics,
one that has highlighted the role of private power in coercing individuals during the novel coronavirus.107 In particular, tort developments
highlight the ways in which the laws of the United States have magni103. COVID-19 Complaint Tracker, HUNTON, https://www.huntonak.com/en/covid-19tracker.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2021).
104. Id. At the time of this writing, the Hunton tracker had recorded only 62 “Wrongful
Death or Personal Injury” claims arising not in the employment, consumer, or healthcare settings. But it had also recorded 149 products liability claims, 67 consumer personal injury claims,
39 medical malpractice claims, 310 healthcare wrongful death claims, and 215 employment cases
including wrongful death and personal injury cases. See also Tom Baker, Covid Coverage Litigation Tracker, U. PA. L., https://cclt.law.upenn.edu/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2021) (documenting a
similarly small number of liability injury cases amidst a much larger number of business interruption insurance cases).
105. Two classic articles here are George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Cases for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUDIES 1, 51 (1984); Michael Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About
the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1155
(1992).
106. WITT, AMERICAN CONTAGIONS, supra note 12, at 98–104, 129–30.
107. Id.
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fied private and hard-to-spot background forms of legal power to exercise new forms of coercive authority.
This use of background legal rules and this allocation of state power
to private parties are the hallmark of the new quarantinism in tort and
elsewhere.108 Where the old quarantinism relied on statist control
over bodies in cordon sanitaires, forced isolation, border maintenance,
and the like, the new quarantinism operates through private power
and legal background rules.109 One central feature of the new private
quarantinism, however, is continuous with its older statist predecessors and with the long history of quarantinist policies in the American
law of epidemics.110 The new quarantinism, like the old, disproportionately disadvantages the vulnerable.111
A. Disparate Impacts
COVID-19 has disproportionately impacted racial and ethnic minorities and lower-income communities.112 The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) has reported on the disparate impact
of the pandemic on racial minorities, noting that the disparities may
be caused, in part, by the fact that “[r]acial and ethnic minority populations are disproportionately represented among essential workers
and industries.”113
After adjusting for different age profiles, the share of deaths among
Hispanics and non-Hispanic Blacks is double or even three times
those populations’ age-adjusted shares of the population – and approximately half the age-adjusted share of the whites and Asian popu108. Id.
109. Id. at 129–33.
110. Id. at 35–60.
111. Id. at 127–28.
112. Christine Little et al., The Impact of Socioeconomic Status on the Clinical Outcomes of
COVID-19; a Retrospective Cohort Study, J. CMTY. HEALTH (Jan. 2, 2021), https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7775835 (“Emerging evidence has raised concerns regarding the disproportionate burden of COVID-19 morbidity and mortality among racial and
ethnic minorities within the US, which has been suggested to stem from socioeconomic disadvantages that place low-income individuals at a higher risk of infection.”); Graeme Wood, What’s
Behind the COVID-19 Racial Disparity, THE ATLANTIC (May 27, 2020), https://
www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/we-dont-know-whats-behind-covid-19-racial-disparity/612106. See also Merlin Chowkwanyun & Adolph L. Reed, Jr., Racial Health Disparities and
Covid-19 – Caution and Context, NEJM (July 16, 2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/
NEJMp2012910?articleTools=true.
113. Health Equity Considerations and Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups, CDC, https://
www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/health-equity/race-ethnicity.html (last updated
Apr. 19, 2021).
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lation.114 Scholars have found powerful correlations between
socioeconomic status and coronavirus outcomes, too.115 Class and socioeconomic status produce COVID-19 risk, though when studies control for socioeconomic status, correlations between racial-minority
status and health outcomes still appear to be strong.116
Two case studies illuminate the disparate impacts of the novel
coronavirus: meatpacking plant workers and incarcerated people.
Both communities are majority non-white117 and low-income,118 and
both have suffered disproportionately from the pandemic.
Consider meatpacking plants, which from early on in the pandemic
experienced serious outbreaks.119 In July 2020, meatpacking plants
were estimated to be in association with between 6% and 8% of
coronavirus cases.120 A year later, meatpacking plants would be associated with at least 59,148 cases and 298 deaths.121 Scientists have
speculated that these outbreaks may have occurred because the factories are “cold and damp, are perfect environments for coronavirus to
linger and spread,” and that the workers are likely “standing right
next to each other working heavily - because of course this is a difficult job - and [thus] breathing heavily.”122 No matter the cause of the
114. CDC, Health Disparities, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/covid19/health_disparities.
htm (last updated Sept. 22, 2021); see also Cary P. Gross et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in
Population Level Covid-19 Mortality, 35 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 3097 (2020).
115. E.g., Richard V. Reeves & Jonathan Rothwell, Class and COVID: How the Less Affluent
Face Double Risks, BROOKINGS (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/
03/27/class-and-covid-how-the-less-affluent-face-double-risks.
116. Little et al., supra note 112 (“However, our analysis revealed a higher risk of hospitalization for non-Hispanic Black and non-white patients of other race, even after adjusting for socioeconomic status, indicating that the higher risk of hospitalization among minority populations
cannot be explained by SES status alone.”).
117. Update: COVID-19 Among Workers in Meat and Poultry Processing Facilities—United
States, April–May 2020, CDC (July 10, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/
mm6927e2.htm (“Among cases with race/ethnicity reported, 87% occurred among racial or ethnic minorities.”) [hereinafter Update: COVID-19 Among Workers].
118. Megan Wallace et al., COVID-19 in Correctional and Detention Facilities — United
States, February–April 2020, CDC (May 15, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/
mm6919e1.htm.
119. Charles A. Taylor et al., Livestock Plants and COVID-19 Transmission, PNAS (May 19,
2020), https://www.pnas.org/content/117/50/31706; Michael Grabell et al., Emails Reveal Chaos
as Meatpacking Companies Fought Health Agencies Over COVID-19 Outbreaks in Their Plants,
PROPUBLICA (June 12, 2020, 2:04 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/emails-reveal-chaosas-meatpacking-companies-fought-health-agencies-over-covid-19-outbreaks-in-their-plants?
utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.
120. Taylor et al., supra note 119.
121. Leah Douglas, Mapping Covid-19 Outbreaks in the Food System, FOOD & ENVIR. REPORTING NETWORK (Apr. 22, 2020), https://thefern.org/2020/04/mapping-covid-19-in-meat-andfood-processing-plants.
122. Anthony Reuben, Coronavirus: Why Have There Been So Many Outbreaks in Meat
Processing Plants?, BBC (June 23, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/53137613.
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widespread transmission, meatpacking workers appear to be especially vulnerable to catching the coronavirus, and meatpacking factory
outbreaks seem to disproportionately affect people of color.123 For example, a CDC multi-state study found that of 9,919 workers infected
with COVID-19 who reported their race, approximately 56% were
Hispanic and 12% were Asian, despite the fact that Hispanics and
Asians made up only 30% and 6% of the meatpacking worker populations respectively.124 The incidence of infections was roughly double
their share of the population.125 Black meatpacking workers suffered
infections at roughly the same rate as their share of the population;
whites, by contrast, made up 40% of the meatpacking worker population and suffered only 13% of the infections.126
Despite large outbreaks and reports of unsafe working conditions,
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) did not
act to protect meatpacking workers. In fact, in February 2021, the
House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis announced
that it began investigating the outbreaks at major national meatpacking companies and OSHA for its handling of these outbreaks.127 The
Subcommittee’s Chairman, Representative James E. Clyburn, charged
that the agency “failed to adequately carry out its responsibility for
enforcing worker safety laws at meatpacking plants across the country, resulting in preventable infections and deaths.” 128 As a response
to hundreds of outbreaks, the agency “issued only eight citations and
less than $80,000 in total penalties” for meatpacking plant safety violations.129 In light of the combination of liability waivers and immunity
legislation, OSHA’s failure to enforce safety laws may leave some
harmed individuals with no recourse for their suffering.
Prison populations in the United States are also disproportionately
composed of racial minorities.130 As in the meatpacking industry, the
123. Update: COVID-19 Among Workers, supra note 117.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Press Release, Select Subcommittee Launches Investigation Into Widespread
Coronavirus Infections And Deaths In Meatpacking Plants, Select Subcomm. on the
Coronavirus Crisis, https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/select-subcommitteelaunches-investigation-widespread-coronavirus-infections-and.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Inmate Race, FED. BUR. OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_race.jsp (last updated Sept. 25, 2021); Ashley Nellis, The Color of Justice: Racial and
Ethnic Disparity in State Prisons, SENTENCING PROJECT (June 14, 2016), https://
www.sentencingproject.org/publications/color-of-justice-racial-and-ethnic-disparity-in-state-prisons/#II.%20Overall%20Findings.
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pandemic caused numerous and severe coronavirus outbreaks in prisons and jails.131 In one state prison in Wisconsin, a little less than 80%
of the incarcerated population and 22.6% of staff members contracted
the coronavirus over the course of just eight weeks.132 Through November 2020, the incarcerated coronavirus death rate for the entire
country was 2.1 times the national rate, although the death rate numbers vary by state.133 The coronavirus infection rate in prisons was
nearly four times the national rate.134 As of November 2020, South
Dakota, Kansas, and Arkansas reported that over 40% of their state
prison populations had contracted coronavirus.135
B. Private Coercions in the Age of the Novel Coronavirus
It is tempting to attribute such disparate impacts to background features like “socio-economic circumstance” or “environment” or “inequality.” Such explanations seem to be tempting because that is how
most people tell the story.136
Robert Hale and the realist analysis of the law suggests a different
account.137 The basic law of property, contract, and tort, plus the law
of housing, employment, and healthcare, are crucial political institutions that produce disparate outcomes in the COVID-19 pandemic as
in so much else. The private delivery of healthcare, social provision,
and education means fundamentally that the law of private property
invites certain people to exploit the resource in question and excludes
others.
These represent the forms of coercive exclusion for our time. Today,
they barely require the active involvement of the state – at least not
visibly. But the exclusion of the poor from the best hospitals with the
best services is the parallel to the Russian cordon sanitaire, which once
upon a time served as the paradigmatic mechanism for the quaran131. Mary Van Beusekom, Studies Detail Large COVID Outbreaks at US Prisons, Jails,
CIDRAP (Apr. 5, 2021), https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2021/04/studies-detaillarge-covid-outbreaks-us-prisons-jails.
132. Rapid Spread of SARS-CoV-2 in a State Prison After Introduction by Newly Transferred
Incarcerated Persons — Wisconsin, August 14–October 22, 2020, CDC (Apr. 2, 2021), https://
www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/70/wr/mm7013a4.htm#contribAff.
133. NAT’L COMM’N ON COVID-19 AND CRIM. JUST., Impact Report: COVID-19 and Prisons
– December 2020 Update (2020), https://covid19.counciloncj.org/2020/12/06/impact-report-covid19-and-prisons.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. E.g., Max Fisher & Emma Bubola, As Cornoavirus Deepens Inequality, Inequality Worsens Its Spread, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/world/europe/
coronavirus-inequality.html.
137. Hale, supra note 45, at 470.
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tinist regimes of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe. The
compulsory closing of the best housing to the poor is our version of
the Prussian soldiers’ order to shoot anyone violating quarantine orders. The way in which access to social provision turns on participating
in the employment market illustrates the point once more. People
with money or other resources found it much easier to navigate virus
risks during the pandemic. People without such resources often had
no choice but to risk infection in order to keep food on the table and a
roof over their heads.
CONCLUSION
In myriad ways, the twenty-first-century legal order has taken basic
features of the liberal order – private property, rights to contract,
background rules of tort – and deployed them to do the coercive work
of allocating and reallocating risk. These core features of the older
progressive-sanitarian regimes have been converted into systems of
coercion and power. The tort law of immunity and waivers are modest
but novel examples of this broader pattern.

